How much bribery could you do if you didn’t even try to hide it?
May. 29th, 2025 06:45 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
Yes, there have been lots of corrupt Federal officials before, but they usually tried to hide their corruption, while Trump is completely open about it: he knows that the only way he can be held accountable is through impeachment, which won’t happen as long as his party controls at least one house of Congress. And the scale is probably at least an order of magnitude beyond all previous Federal bribery scandals combined.
It raises some interesting questions: assuming Trump left office and we still had a vaguely functioning republic, how would we even begin to fix this?
(1) Overturn the Supreme Court’s immunity decision, and make clear that somebody who uses Presidential powers to commit a crime can be prosecuted for that crime. For example, the President has nearly unlimited pardon power, but granting a pardon in exchange for money would still be prosecutable as bribery. This would require either a SCOTUS decision or, better, a Constitutional amendment.
(2) Put teeth in the emoluments clause. We can’t expect the DoJ to criminally charge a sitting President, but we could impose a 100% income tax rate on the fair market value of any gift the President (or any other Federal officer) receives in violation of the emoluments clause. This could be done by act of Congress, and signed into law by one honest President.
(3) Make impeachment slightly easier —- say, a 3/5 majority in the Senate rather than a 2/3 majority. Again, this would require a Constitutional amendment. Trump’s second impeachment failed to convict by a vote of 57-43, not quite a 3/5 majority, but the margin would have been much less comfortable, and three more Republican Senators might have voted to convict if they had thought it possible to come out on the winning side.
(4) How to deal with cryptocurrency? The basic problem is that it enables anybody who wishes, anywhere in the world, to put large amounts of money directly into the President’s pocket, anonymously but verifiably if the donor wishes to prove it to the recipient in private. If you were designing a system to encourage bribery, you couldn’t do much better. And the Trumps are currently using it in several different ways, as the Times interview points out:
(a) direct gifts from the donor’s “wallet” to the recipient’s,
(b) purchases of assets from which the recipient receives a transaction fee,
(c) purchases of floating assets of which the recipient holds a lot, driving up their price, and
(d) purchases of stablecoins from the recipient, which must be backed by actual dollars so they amount to a zero-interest loan to the recipient (who can invest the money in something interest-bearing).
For all of these, the novel problem is anonymity: the public, the IRS, and law enforcement have no way of knowing who gave the President (or other public official) how much money when. If we could fix that, at least for a limited class of recipients (high-level Federal government officials), the usual mechanisms of accountability would at least have a chance to do their jobs.
Existing law requires certain categories of government officials (including the President and Vice President) to file financial disclosure forms, within 30 days of taking office and annually thereafter, identifying the sources and amounts of income, gifts, and reimbursements. In a crypto account, some income, gifts and reimbursements are likely to be truly anonymous, and you can't report what you don't know -- but you can still report the total amounts of anonymous transfers, and you can report the account numbers of any such accounts that you own, so the information can be verified. And the tax code could be amended to apply a 100% income tax rate to the total value of such anonymous receipts beyond an annual threshold.
That would work for dodges (a), (b), and (d), but not for dodge (c), the “driving up the price” trick, unless applied to every purchaser of the asset, even those with no interest in bribing public officials. Fortunately, this is the most unwieldy, inconvenient trick of the four: it costs the donor a lot of money, depending on market demand, to drive up the price of a publicly-held asset sufficiently to affect the recipient's behavior, and the recipient can't realize the gains except by selling large amounts of the asset, which pushes the price back down.